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1 Introduction
Although venture capital contracts have received considerable attention lately, there has been
very little theoretical work trying to understand the particular terms that venture capitalists
use. Among other things, the interaction between cash-flow and control rights in venture
capital is still far from being understood. This paper proposes the first optimal contracting
model to account for the joint pattern of control and cash-flow rights observed in venture
capital contracts.
Recent works on venture capital contracting have pointed out that investors’ control
rights may well be allocated independently of cash-flow rights, through diﬀerent sets of
covenants.1 One notable example is the widespread use, in venture capital deals, of several
classes of common stock to which are attached very diﬀerent voting, board and liquidation
rights. Hence, the complex set of rights attributed to investors cannot be exhaustively
described by standard securities like common stock, debt, or preferred stock. This suggests
that venture capital contracting theory should focus on the allocation of diﬀerent rights
through contractual covenants rather than on the use of a particular security. We take this
approach here.
Control and cash-flow rights seem to follow a joint pattern in real VC contracts, which
suggests they are strongly interrelated. In their extensive study of venture capital agree-
ments, Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) find that VCs’ control is positively correlated to the
performance sensitivity of the entrepreneur’s cash-flow rights. Also, when VCs have vot-
ing control, their cash-flow rights are more likely to take the form of preferred stock. More
generally, contractual terms increasingly adopted in the corporate world display similar char-
acteristics. In corporate venturing deals and sophisticated partnership deals between biotech
start-ups and big drug companies, the corporate investor typically takes a majority equity
stake in the emerging start-up but few or no seats on the board of directors. This evidence is
somehow puzzling, in that - contrary to common wisdom - riskier claims are often associated
to weak control rights. Unfortunately, theoretical models of financial contracting cannot oﬀer
an explanation for this puzzle.2
We study the optimal contracting problem of an early start-up seeking venture capital
finance and argue that two non-contractible factors are crucial for the start-up’s success.
First, at the seed stage, the entrepreneur must exert enough eﬀort in pursuing research and
1For instance, Hellmann (1998) argues that “the separation of control rights from financial structure
is important since for any given financial structure it is always possible to allocate control rights indepen-
dently....if control emanates from holding the majority of the voting stock, then voting power can be attached
to any financial instrument.”
2With the exceptions of Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Hellmann (1998), in most models control
and cash-flow rights are not interrelated: the focus is either on the allocation of control (Aghion-Bolton,
1992) or on the design of the investor’s claim. The list of papers deriving the optimal outside claims leaving
aside control issues is too long to be reported here. We refer to Harris and Raviv (1991) or Kaplan and
Strömberg’s (2000) comprehensive bibliographies.
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analyzing the diﬀerent projects available (EN initiative). At a later stage, after research has
been carried out and a project has been selected by the controlling party, the venture capi-
talist must give professional advice in formulating the firm’s strategy, provide introductions
to potential customers and suppliers, help recruit key employees (VC support). Moreover,
in the spirit of Aghion and Tirole (1997), we argue that the venture capitalist’s real control
over project selection discourages entrepreneurial initiative.
The central trade-oﬀ in our model is one between the entrepreneur’s early incentives and
the venture capitalist’s late incentives.3 To induce VC support, one would like to sell the
venture capitalist a very risky claim. However - if VC is granted formal control over project
selection - a risky claim induces excessive VC interference,4 which in turn kills EN initiative.
In other words, when a venture capitalist holds a risky claim, the cost of her formal control in
terms of entrepreneurial initiative may become too high. This trade-oﬀ formalizes a typical
entrepreneurial attitude towards venture capitalists: on the one hand, entrepreneurs like VC
investors to support their firms with professional advice and connections. On the other hand,
entrepreneurs are unhappy with VCs who exercise too much control on the firm.
We argue that an appropriate design of financial claims and control rights may enable
entrepreneurs to induce VC support (the bright side of venture capital) while limiting VC
interference (the dark side of venture capital). Intuitively, when the need for VC support calls
for very high-powered incentives to the investor, the entrepreneur should retain control, thus
avoiding any risk of interference. We predict that in the optimal arrangement the venture
capitalist will hold cash-flow rights that resemble either common or preferred stock. When
VC support matters, the venture capitalist holds a class of common stock with no formal
control, whereas the entrepreneur holds preferred stock and retains control. When instead
VC support is not very costly or not essential, the VC holds preferred stock but is given
formal control. This result challenges the widespread idea that common stock should always
be associated to more control rights with respect to preferred stock, and is in line with the
use - in real-world VC contracts - of classes of common stock with very limited control rights
attached.
This paper also provides a theoretical explanation to the striking evidence documented
by Kaplan and Strömberg (2000), namely the inclusion in VC deals of contingencies that
trigger both a reduction of VC formal control and the conversion of her preferred stock
into common stock. Existing theories of contingent venture capital deals do not account for
this joint evolution of control and cash-flow rights. In particular, it is not clear why after
3Conversely, many papers stressing the advising role of VC investors are concerned with the simultaneous,
double-sided moral hazard problem arising when both the entrepreneur and the VC must support a project
after it has been selected. See for instance Repullo and Suarez (1999) and Casamatta (2000).
4There is a fundamental diﬀerence between VC support and VC interference. To interfere in the firm’s
decisions (e.g., imposing a plan of action to the entrepreneur, reverting entrepreneurial decisions), a VC
investor needs formal control. Conversely, an investor can provide support and advice even if she has no
control rights.
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attainment of good performance, while VC’s control rights are reduced, her claim becomes
riskier (from preferred equity to common equity). It is somehow puzzling that the investor’s
control rights are reduced when her claim (preferred stock) is converted in one (common
stock) that in standard contracts is associated with more control (in the sense of more
voting rights). We show that this contingent allocation of control and cash-flows may indeed
be optimal in start-up financing.
The paper proceeds as follows. A review of the related literature is provided first. Then,
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 draws a distinction between formal and real control,
and shows how a riskier financial claim increases the investor’s real control. Moreover, it
delineates the trade-oﬀ between inducing VC support and avoiding VC interference, showing
that the latter discourages entrepreneurial initiative. Section 4 analyzes the benchmark case
where VC support is contractible. It is shown that the optimal contract allocates formal
control to VC but limits the riskiness of her financial claim, which then can be interpreted
as preferred stock. Section 5 studies optimal control and cash-flow rights when VC support
is not contractible. It is shown that when support is very costly, it is optimal to give the VC
a very risky claim (common stock) but no control rights. Section 6 draws a simple extension
of the model where an early signal of profitability accrues. The optimal contract is then
very similar to the contingent control and cash-flow right allocations described in Kaplan
and Strömberg (2000). Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Literature review
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), hereafter referred to as DT, have been the first to point out
that control and cash-flow rights are interrelated. They argue that, when monetary incentives
are not suﬃcient to discipline managers, the optimal capital structure will allow for multiple
claim-holders with contingent control rights: debt-holders (who prefer manager-unfriendly
actions) should have control after bad performance, and equity-holders (whose preferences
are more aligned with the manager’s) should have control after good performance. Disliking
debt-holders’ intervention, the manager will have incentives to work in order to attain a good
performance.
The present paper also studies the joint pattern of income rights and control rights.
However, the focus is completely diﬀerent. DT try to rationalize the existence of multiple
claims, and to explain the observed correlation between control and cash-flow rights within
standard securities, like debt or equity, used by traditional corporations. We focus on the
more innovative venture capital arrangements, where studying the properties of standard
securities does not make much sense. Secondly, the channel that links control rights and
financial claims is also diﬀerent. In DT, an outsider’s claim works as an incentive scheme
to take the appropriate course of action when she is in control.5 Therefore, the design of a
5What the optimal course of action is depends in turn on the need to provide ex-ante incentives to the
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claim determines how control is exercised by its holders. In our paper, the investor’s claim
determines to which extent she eﬀectively exercises control (this is not the case in DT, where
formal and eﬀective control always coincide) in that a riskier claim makes the investor more
eager to interfere in the firm’s decisions.
Finally, our papers yield diﬀerent predictions on the use of contingent contracts. DT’s
optimal contract can be implemented through a contingent claim with uncontingent control:
a single controlling investor holding a debt-like claim when early profitability is low, and an
equity-like claim when profitability is high. In contrast, we predict that a VC investor should
hold a contingent claim with contingent control rights: after good signals of profitability, the
investor’s preferred stock is converted into common stock and control is transferred back to
the entrepreneur. This prediction is more in line with existing evidence on venture capital
agreements.
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), hereafter BGP, have already argued that investors’
high-powered claims are detrimental to entrepreneurial initiative, in that they turn formal
control into eﬀective interference. In their model, this implies that outside voting equity
should not be concentrated in the hands of a few shareholders.6 The focus of their paper is
the (over-interference) cost of ownership concentration, and not the simultaneous design of
control rights and financial claims: first, due to the structure of payoﬀs (either R or zero), no
prediction can be drawn on the impact of security design on real control and entrepreneurial
initiative. Secondly, the allocation of formal control is not endogenously derived; rather, it
is assumed that a large equity stake always comes with formal control.
The concern that excess interference kills entrepreneurial initiative is definitely relevant
to venture capital. However, for young and innovative firms, the venture capitalist’s support
matters at least as much as entrepreneurial initiative. The novel point of our paper is that
venture capital contracts should take into account both sides of the coin, that is, try to induce
the investor’s support while limiting her interference. Solving this trade-oﬀ requires a more
innovative design of cash-flow and control rights with respect to the contractual solution
envisioned in BGP for large, publicly traded firms.
In Renucci (2000), investors’ advice directly enhances profit maximization but may re-
quire entrepreneurs to forgo their private benefits. Hence, having an investor-advisor (a
“tight relationship” with the investor) has both benefits and costs. When entrepreneurial
private benefits are large, it is better not to have investors make recommendations; as a
manager. As investors’ incentives are instrumental to curb managerial moral hazard, they do not necessarily
induce ex-post maximization of the firm’s value.
6This result parallels that obtained by Pagano and Röell (1995), who predict that the founder of a
company may want to go public in order to temper the involvement of outside shareholders by limiting their
stakes. In that paper, the cost of excess monitoring comes from the fact that the initial owner cares not only
about the market value of the company but also about his future private benefits as manager of the firm. As
in BGP, ownership concentration inevitably leads to excess intervention, as large equity stakes always come
with formal control in those two papers.
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consequence, it is optimal to issue dispersed equity. Conversely, when private benefits are
small, entrepreneurs do want investors’ advice. In this case, the design of cash-flow rights
trades-oﬀ the investor’s incentives with the entrepreneur’s incentives: the lower the private
benefit (the milder entrepreneurial moral hazard), the riskier is the investor’s claim. In stark
contrast with our work, control rights are not explicitly analyzed in that paper. Hence,
investors’ interference can only be avoided by reducing her incentives for information gather-
ing, thus forgoing the benefits of advice. In our paper, two diﬀerent contractual instruments
- claims design and control allocation - can be used to spur investors’ advice and support
while forgoing excessive interference.
Hellmann (1998) defines control rights independently of financial claims, so that a high
equity stake is not necessarily associated with control. In his paper, a specific control right,
the right to appoint the CEO, is relinquished to the venture capitalist to provide her suﬃcient
incentives to engage in an executive search. Providing such incentives by raising the investor’s
equity-stake would require giving the entrepreneur a low-powered claim, thus reducing his
eﬀort. Hellmann’s point is thus that VC’s incentives are better provided through control
rights while cash-flow rights (equity) should take care of entrepreneurial incentives. This
result is severely aﬀected once one allows control to spur entrepreneurial initiative as well,
as the present paper does. Although Hellmann’s results are consistent with some stylized
facts of venture capital, namely the allocation of voting control to VCs at the early stage
of financings, they do not account for the evidence that control is shifted to entrepreneurs
at the late financing stage and in general after good short-term performance. Hellmann’s
prediction that venture capitalists should ask superior control rights is also at odds with
the common practice in corporate venturing, whereby corporate investors do not seek board
seats in portfolio companies.7
2 The model
An entrepreneur has one idea which requires external financing. To turn his idea into a
real business, the entrepreneur has to pay a set up cost I, but he has no money. To raise
the amount I, the entrepreneur (EN) makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract oﬀer to a venture
capitalist (VC) and, if needed, to passive outside investors as well. Passive investors play
no role in the firm’s management; they just need to break even to participate in the firm’s
financing. Investors behave competitively in the market for funds.
7Furthermore, in contrast to the present work, the paper does not make any security design prediction
on whether VC’s cash-flow rights should resemble common stock, preferred stock or convertible debt.
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Projects
The start-up faces N+1 a priori identical projects,8 k ∈ {0, 1, 2, .....,N}. All projects may
fail (yield income RL > 0) or succeed (yield income RH = RL+∆R), but they diﬀer in their
probability of success and the nonverifiable private cost they engender for EN. Although the
project choice is observable by informed parties, it is not verifiable.
The status-quo project (project 0) is known: it succeeds with probability p and imposes a
private cost γ > 0 on the entrepreneur. The payoﬀs attached to the N other projects are not
known unless further investigation is carried out. It is known that (N−2) projects are worse
than project 0 for both VC and EN, and at least one of them has disastrous consequences
for the firm, in that it brings the probability of success to zero and imposes a cost γk = −∞
on EN. Two projects, indexed N − 1 and N, have the following probabilities of success and
private costs:
0 N − 1 N probability
p, γ p+ τ , 0 p, γ λ
p, γ p+ τ , γ p, 0 1− λ
where p+ τ ∈ (0; 1).
Following Aghion and Tirole (1997), λ measures the congruence of interests between EN
and VC. We assume:
(A1) λ ∈ (0, 1)
Moreover, we assume:
(A2) τ∆R > γ > τ B
p
Where, as it will be clear later, B
p
is the entrepreneur’s additional utility when high
rather than low profits are realized. Project N − 1 is the most eﬃcient one. However,
with probability (1− λ) the entrepreneur prefers project N , whereas the venture capitalist
always prefers project N − 1. The assumptions λ < 1 and γ > τ B
p
ensure that EN and VC’s
preferences over projects are not always aligned, and thus control allocation matters. The
assumption λ > 0 ensures that EN sometimes has the same objectives as VC. Thus, the
latter may want to adopt EN’s proposed project even when EN has no formal authority to
impose it.
The Information Gathering Stage
After paying the set up cost I, the entrepreneur exerts a nonverifiable eﬀort e ∈ [0, 1] to
screen among diﬀerent projects. At a private cost e2
2
he learns the payoﬀ of all candidate
8When the contract is signed, an entrepreneurial idea already exists, but it is still vague: there may be
diﬀerent variants of the same product to choose among, or diﬀerent business plans to follow to market and
sell the product. We define each of these options as a project.
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projects with probability e. This eﬀort could be interpreted as additional research pursued
to produce a well-defined business plan (prototype building, product tests, etc.). Simultane-
ously, the venture capitalist can exert a nonverifiable eﬀort E ∈ [0, 1] at a cost E2
2
, to monitor
the entrepreneur’s research activity. VC can only become informed if the entrepreneur is: if
EN learns the project payoﬀs, VC also learns them with probability E, and does not learn
with probability (1− E).
Project selection
The formal authority to choose a project can be allocated either to the entrepreneur or the
venture capitalist. Under VC-formal control, the entrepreneur can make a project proposal;
the venture capitalist may then adopt the entrepreneur’s proposal or choose another project.
She does so only if she is informed about the project payoﬀs and the proposal is not congruent
with her objectives. Otherwise, she optimally rubber-stamps EN’s recommendation, since
with probability λ > 0 EN’s favorite project is also VC’s favorite project. Under EN-formal
control, the entrepreneur has the right to choose his preferred project. The existence of
“disastrous projects” ensures that, when uninformed about the projects’ payoﬀs, both EN
and VC optimally adopt the status quo project (project 0).
The Moral Hazard Stage
After a project is selected, both EN and VC have to spend eﬀort on its implementation.
Their eﬀorts are unverifiable and complementary:9 if both parties “behave”,10 the probability
of success is p > 0. If either the investor or the entrepreneur “misbehaves”, the probability
of success is zero. When the entrepreneur misbehaves, he enjoys a private benefit B > 0;
when the venture capitalist misbehaves, she enjoys a private benefit c > 0. We assume that
the start-up is worth funding only if the contractual arrangement induces both EN and VC
to behave.11 When this is the case, even the status-quo project (project 0) has a positive
value:
(A3) p∆R +RL − I − γ > 0
Preferences
Venture capitalists and passive investors are risk-neutral. The entrepreneur’s expected
utility for project k is:
Uk(R
L
en, R
H
en) =
½
RLen + (p + τk)(RHen −RLen)− γk when RHen −RLen < Bp
RLen + (p + τk)Bp − γk when R
H
en −RLen ≥ Bp
where τk ∈ {0; τ}, γk ∈ {0; γ}, and RLen (RHen) is the monetary payment he receives after
low (high) profits are realized. The entrepreneur’s utility is a concave function of money. This
9Complementarity between eﬀorts is not crucial to our results. It is assumed here only to simplify the
notation.
10For a description of the role of VC’s eﬀort at this stage, see section 3.1.
11For this, it is suﬃcient to assume that RL + τ∆R− I +B + c < 0.
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particular utility function captures in a very simple way the idea that monetary incentives
have a limited impact on the entrepreneur’s provision of research eﬀort.
Contracts
The entrepreneur makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract oﬀer to the venture capitalist spec-
ifying the parties’ cash-flow rights and control-rights. The contract must also specify VC’s
outlay Ivc ≤ I whenever passive investors are present; otherwise, VC’s outlay is equal to
I. Due to the non-verifiability of projects, cash-flow rights can be contingent on the final
outcome, but not on the project choice. Hence, cash-flow rights specify VC and EN’s payoﬀ
in case of failure (RLvc and R
L
en) and success (R
H
vc and R
H
en). When present, passive investors
receive (RL−RLvc−RLen) or (RH−RHvc−RHen). Entrepreneurs are protected by limited liability:
RLen ≥ 0 and RHen ≥ 0. We define the variable
δvc = RHvc −RLvc
as the power of VC’s incentives, or the riskiness of the financial claim. As projects cannot
be described and contracted upon ex ante, the contract must also allocate to either EN or
VC the formal control over project selection.
Timing
The timing of events is summarized in the following figure:
-
Contract
stage
I
Information
stage
Eﬀorts e,E Project
selected
Moral hazard
stage
EN work/shirk
VC support/not
Outcome
stage
Verifiable
profit: RH or RL
Figure 1: Time line
There are typically four stages in the life of an innovative start-up, before a verifiable
signal of success or failure occurs. At the contracting stage, the entrepreneur receives seed
finance12 from a venture capitalist, in exchange for cash-flow and control rights in the firm.
At the information gathering stage, research is carried out to redefine the entrepreneurial idea
and turn it into a real project. Both VC and EN are actively involved in this stage; however,
as research requires specialized technological skills, the entrepreneur’s role is crucial. After a
12Seed finance “allows a business idea to be developed, perhaps involving the production of a business
plan, prototypes and additional research, prior to bringing a product to market and commencing large-scale
manufacturing” (A Guide to Venture Capital, British Venture Capital Association, page 16).
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business plan is selected by the party in control, its implementation requires further eﬀorts
from both the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. The implementation stage has more
to do with bringing the product to market. Hence, the venture capitalist’s support becomes
crucial at this stage.
3 The trade-oﬀ between VC’s support and excess in-
terference
Our model captures what we believe are two main phenomena in innovative, venture-funded
start-ups. First, start-ups face multiple moral hazard problems at diﬀerent stages of their
life. At the information gathering stage (stage 1), the main issue is to induce EN and VC to
exert the optimal amount of research in order to pick the best available project. However,
even when the “right” project is adopted, its value can be jeopardized if VC does not support
its implementation at stage 2. At that stage, providing incentives to the venture capitalist is
crucial. Secondly, entrepreneurs dislike excessive interference, and thus are willing to limit
VC’s eﬀective control through an appropriate design of her claim. An optimal venture capital
deal should ideally induce VC support while limiting VC interference.
3.1 The moral hazard stage
As in much of the literature on venture capital finance, we assume that the investor plays an
active role in determining a start-up’s success.13 It is a well documented fact that venture
capitalists are actively engaged in managing the firms they fund. Venture capitalists help
recruit key personnel, advice the entrepreneur on strategic decisions, provide introductions
to potential customers and suppliers. We define all these activities as VC support ; c is then
the private cost borne by VC when providing support. An alternative interpretation for
VC’s moral hazard is the following. The venture capitalist may “cannibalize” the project,
for instance, by stealing the entrepreneurial idea and using it to fund a new, competing
venture. In this case, she gains c but drives the firm’s probability of success to zero. The
fear of idea expropriation is indeed a relevant concern for innovative entrepreneurs.14
13Gorman and Sahlman (1989) provide extensive evidence on the time venture capitalists devote to support
portfolio companies. For models stressing the advising/supporting role of venture capitalists, see Repullo
and Suarez (1999), Schmidt (1999), Casamatta (2000), and Renucci (2000). In these models, as well as in
our model, the venture capitalist’s eﬀort directly increases the profitability of a project. Hence, she is more
an advisor than a monitor à la Holmström and Tirole (1997).
14The risk of value-destroying actions is perceived as very strong in the venture capital world (see also
the discussion in section 7). For instance, here is Silver’s (1984) advice to new entrepreneurs approaching a
corporation’s venture capital arm: “beware of corporate oﬃcers disguised as venture capitalists! Many are
the corporations who attempt to kill new companies whose products may become competitive.” Hellmann
(1998) trades oﬀ this cost with the benefits of corporate venture capital financing. In Ueda (2000), the dark
side of venture capital is the threat that the investor duplicate the project when intellectual property rights
are weak. Finally, in Cestone and White (2000) a venture capital contract is designed so as to commit the
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At stage 2, in order that the entrepreneur works and the venture capitalist supports the
start-up, the cash-flow rights have to satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints:
p(RHen −RLen) ≥ B
or
(RHen −RLen) ≥
B
p
(ICen)
and:
p(RHvc −RLvc) ≥ c
or
δvc ≥
c
p
(ICvc)
We assume that ∆R = RH − RL ≥ B
p
+ c
p
, that is, there is no tension between second
period incentives. The relevant tension here is between VC’s early and late incentives.
Indeed, VC late moral hazard imposes an important constraint on the structure of the
financial arrangement: the venture capitalist must be given a suﬃciently risky financial
claim for the project to be worth funding. However, a very risky claim may induce VC to
gather too much information and over-interfere with the firm’s decisions at stage 1. We show
this in the following subsection.
3.2 Formal versus eﬀective control
The allocation of formal control in a venture capital arrangement does not describe per se
who will take the relevant decisions in the start-up’s life. Indeed, formal control rights turn
into eﬀective control only when the controlling party has enough information to exercise
them.15 In our model, an uninformed VC (EN) never dares choosing (proposing) a project
without being informed on payoﬀs. Moreover, EN’s preferences are sometimes congruent
with VC’s (λ > 0). Hence, an uninformed VC will not exercise her control but rather adopt
EN’s proposal, whenever there is one.
• Under EN-Formal Control, the utility functions of EN and VC are:
VC not to fund a competing firm.
15For a general analysis of formal versus real authority in organizations, we refer the reader to Aghion and
Tirole’s (1997) seminal paper.
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UENen = R
L
en + p
B
p
+ eλτ B
p
− (1− e)γ − e2
2
UENvc = R
L
vc + pδvc + eλτδvc − E
2
2
As VC can only be informed if EN is, VC never has any real control under this arrange-
ment. If EN is informed, he selects his favorite project, which is also the value-enhancing
project with probability λ.16 Otherwise, he adopts the status-quo project. When EN is in
control, information gathering eﬀorts at stage 1 are:
eEN = λτ B
p
+ γ and EEN = 0
Note that eﬀort levels do not depend on the shape of VC’s claim.17
For EN-Control to be feasible, we need to assume that the income that can be credibly
pledged to VC under such arrangement is larger than the funds provided. Hence, we will
assume throughout:
(A4) RL + [p+ eENλτ ]
³
∆R− B
p
´
> I
• Under VC-Formal Control, the utility functions of EN and VC are:
UV Cen = R
L
en + p
B
p
+ e[E + (1− E)λ]τ B
p
− eE(1− λ)γ − (1− e)γ − e2
2
UV Cvc = R
L
vc + pδvc + e[E + (1−E)λ]τδvc − E
2
2
With probability eE, VC has real control: she picks the value-enhancing project, that
imposes an expected cost (1 − λ)γ on EN. However, with probability e(1 − E), EN has
eﬀective control: VC rubber-stamps EN’s proposal, which has probability λ of being the
value-enhancing project. Finally, when the parties are uninformed (with probability (1−e)),
the status-quo project is adopted.
In this case, the reaction functions in information gathering for EN and VC are:
e =
h
λτ B
p
+ γ
i
−
³
γ − τ B
p
´
(1− λ)E
and
E = τδvc(1− λ)e.
16Owing to the non-verifiability of project choice, no contract may ensure that an informed entrepreneur
always chooses the value-enhancing project. See however the next footnote.
17The result that VC never has any real control and thus does not gather information under EN’s formal
control depends on our implicitely ruling out option contracts. Suppose the initial contract assigns VC a
convertible claim. Conversion must occur after project selection, and gives the right to a higher share of
profits in the failure state. If the conversion rate is appropriately designed, whenever VC is informed about
project payoﬀs, she will convert her claim after observing that project N has been selected, and not convert
after project N − 1 has been selected. This option then gives VC incentives to gather information about
projects. The threat of conversion may induce EN to choose project N − 1, so that finally VC does enjoy
some real control. However, as EN must be given an incompressible stake Bp in the firm’s upside, but on the
other hand cannot bear too much risk, it may not be possible to design such an option.
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The entrepreneur’s research eﬀort or initiative is spurred by the prospect of having real
control. Information gathering (E), and increased interference, by the venture capitalist can
only inhibit such initiative. On the other hand, when VC’s financial claim is riskier (e.g., δvc
is larger), she invests more in information gathering and thus interferes more often in the
start-up’s life. Combining the parties’ FOCs, and assuming interior solutions, we obtain the
equilibrium values of e and E under VC-Formal Control :
eV C(δvc) =
λτ B
p
+γ
1+(γ−τ Bp )(1−λ)2τδvc
and EV C(δvc) =
(λτ Bp +γ)(1−λ)δvc
1+(γ−τ Bp )(1−λ)2τδvc
.
It is immediate to observe that:
∂E
∂δvc > 0 and
∂e
∂δvc < 0
The extent to which a venture capitalist turns her control rights into real control depends
on the riskiness of her claim (δvc). A riskier claim makes VC more eager to interfere in the
project selection process. This in turn reduces entrepreneurial autonomy, hence discouraging
initiative.18
3.3 The trade-oﬀ
The above analysis shows that - whenever VC is granted control rights over project selection
- a trade-oﬀ between VC support and excess interference arises. Two crucial factors con-
tribute to turn an entrepreneurial idea into a successful firm. First, the entrepreneur must
devote enough eﬀort to analyzing the diﬀerent projects available, before one is selected (EN’s
initiative).19 Second, the venture capitalist must provide suﬃcient advice and support when
the project is implemented (VC’s support). The design of the venture capitalist’s claim has
two eﬀects. On the one hand, it may spur VC’s support to the project, which makes a risky
claim desirable. On the other hand, it determines her incentives to gather information. The
latter must be calibrated so as to avoid an “interference-kills-initiative” eﬀect. In this sense,
a very risky claim may be suboptimal.
4 The benchmark: Contractible VC support
We now study the optimal venture capital deal when the degree of VC’s support at stage
2 is verifiable and thus can be contracted upon. We proceed in the following way: we
derive the optimal cash-flow rights under, respectively, EN-Formal Control and VC-Formal
18This is a straightforward extension of Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi’s (1997) result that initiative is
inhibited when voting equity is concentrated in the hands of a large shareholder. Section 1.1 drew the major
diﬀerences between their paper and our contribution.
19Note that at this stage the investor’s information-gathering eﬀort cannot make up for insuﬃcient en-
trepreneurial initiative, as VC can become informed only if EN is.
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Control. We then compare the surplus generated by the venture under the two arrangements
to determine the optimal control rights allocation.
4.1 Cash-flow rights under EN-control
When the entrepreneur has formal control, information gathering eﬀorts do not depend on
the shape of the investor’s claim. Hence, VC will never interfere in the project selection even
if she holds an arbitrarily risky claim in the start-up. This will be the case at the optimum,
as the risk-averse entrepreneur will leave VC with most of the risk:20
Lemma 1 Under EN-Control, the optimal contract gives VC the riskiest claim compatible
with entrepreneurial incentives: δENvc = ∆R − Bp and R
L
vc = I −
£
p+ eENλτ
¤ ³
∆R − B
p
´
<
RL.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that under EN-Control the value of the venture does not depend on δENvc :
V EN =
©
RL + p∆R− γ − I
ª
+ eEN [λτ∆R+ γ]− (e
EN )2
2
4.2 Cash-flow rights under VC-control
When VC has formal control on the project selection, the shape of her financial claim has
a crucial impact on the extent of real control she exercises, and thus on entrepreneurial
initiative. In this case, the value of the venture is:
V V C(δvc) =
©
RL + p∆R− γ − I
ª
+ eV C [λτ∆R+ γ] +
eV CEV C(1− λ) [τ∆R − γ]− (e
V C)2
2
− (E
V C)2
2
with eV C = eV C(δvc) and EV C = EV C(δvc). The optimal cash-flow rights then solve:
MaxRLvc,δvc,Ivc V
V C(δvc)
s.t.:
(ICen) R
H
en −RLen ≥ Bp
(IRvc) R
L
vc + pδvc + e[λ+ E(1− λ)]τδvc − E
2
2
≥ Ivc
(IRou) {p+ e[λ+ E(1− λ)]τ}
³
∆R− B
p
− δvc
´
= I − Ivc
(LLen) R
H
en ≥ 0; RLen ≥ 0
where: e = eV C(δvc) E = EV C(δvc)
20One may argue that this contract is not unique. Equivalently, one could set δvc < ∆R − Bp and have
passive outside investors co-finance the firm and bear the residual risk ∆R− Bp − δvc. However, this is no
longer true in the general model with continuous support: as we show in the appendix, in that case it is
uniquely optimal to give VC the riskiest claim compatible with EN’s incentives.
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(ICen) is the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint for stage-2 eﬀort and (IRvc) is the venture
capitalist’s participation constraint and (IRou) is the outside investors’ participation con-
straint. (LLen) ensures limited liability for the entrepreneur, while eV C(δvc) and EV C(δvc)
are defined in section 3.2. The following proposition shows that - under VC-Control - the
venture capitalist must hold a safer financial claim than under EN-Control:
Proposition 2 When the venture capitalist is granted formal control rights over the start-
up, it is optimal to limit the riskiness of her claim: δV Cvc < ∆R− Bp = δ
EN
vc .
Proof. Following the lines of Burkart-Gromb-Panunzi (1997), the optimal level of δvc is
determined by solving:
dV V C
dδvc
=
∂V V C
∂e
de
dδvc
+
∂V V C
∂E
dE
dδvc
= 0
where the first term represents the “initiative eﬀect” and is always negative due to de
dδvc < 0.
The second term is the “control eﬀect”, which is negative for δvc = ∆R− Bp . It follows that
δvc = ∆R − Bp cannot be an optimum. Note that, as δvc < ∆R −
B
p
, passive investors are
brought in so as to bear the residual risk
³
∆R− B
p
− δvc
´
. See the Appendix for a detailed
proof.
The intuition is straightforward: when investors hold risky financial claims, they have
stronger incentives to become informed about the firm’s prospects and interfere in its deci-
sions. As a consequence, their formal control rights turn into excessive real control, or over-
interference. Entrepreneurial initiative is then discouraged. In other words, when investors
hold equity-like claims, the cost of control in terms of entrepreneurial initiative becomes too
high. Hence, entrepreneurs granting control rights to venture capitalists should sell them a
financial claim that is not too sensitive to the firm’s profits. The above result challenges
a widespread view in textbook corporate finance, namely, the idea that risky claims, like
common equity, should be always associated to more control. We have proved that this need
not be the case: when entrepreneurial initiative is essential, riskier financial claims (e.g.
common equity) should be granted less control rights.21
4.3 Optimal control allocation
Assumption (A4) guarantees that EN-Formal Control is a feasible arrangement: the en-
trepreneur is not obliged to relinquish formal control to the venture capitalist in order to
obtain funding. Yet, the entrepreneur may voluntarily relinquish control to VC as the latter
21It is true in general that common equity receives more voting rights than, say, preferred equity. But
- in sophisticated financial contracts like VC deals - many other control rights (ex., seats on the board,
authority to appoint the C.E.O.) contribute to determine the extent of formal control enjoyed by investors.
Our point is then that the overall formal control enjoyed by an investor and the riskiness of her claim should
be negatively correlated.
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will choose the eﬃcient project more often than EN himself would do.22 However, to prevent
excessive control from destroying EN’s initiative, VC’s real control is limited by reducing
her incentives for information-gathering. This result is stated in:
Proposition 3 When VC’s support is contractible, it is always optimal to release formal
control to VC, and give her a relatively safe financial claim in the start-up.
Proof. Assumption (A4) ensures that under both EN-Control and VC-Control the in-
vestor’s pledgeable income is larger than the financial need I. Therefore, the optimal control
allocation is simply the one that maximizes the value of the venture. When VC’s claim can
be freely designed, VC-Control can do at least as well as EN-Control, as MaxδvcV
V C(δvc) ≥
V EN . Therefore, VC is granted formal control, and her claim is made “relatively” safe as
Proposition 2 predicts. See the Appendix for a detailed proof.
Following Hart (1995), the optimal allocation of authority in a venture trades oﬀ ex-ante
incentives with ex-post eﬃciency. In our model, ex-post eﬃciency requires that project N−1
is selected at stage 1, as τ∆R > γ. When VC is in control, she always chooses the eﬃcient
project, whereas EN may choose a suboptimal project when he is in control.23 This makes
VC control desirable. On the other hand, VC’s control on project selection may destroy
EN’s incentives to gather information on available projects, thus reducing the value of the
venture. This eﬀect is stronger when VC’s claim is riskier and thus she exerts too much
real control. The solution is then to allocate formal control rights to VC and appropriately
shape VC’s financial claim so as to induce the ex-ante optimal level of real control.
5 Optimal control and cash-flow rights when VC sup-
port is not contractible
We now turn to the case where VC’s support to the venture is not observable. In this case, the
need to provide incentives to VC imposes a relevant constraint on the contract: the riskiness
of the claim, δvc, cannot be smaller than cp . Under VC-Formal Control, this constraint may
bind if c is very large: then, VC has excessive incentives to monitor the start-up and has too
much real control. This in turn reduces EN’s initiative and the value of the venture V V C.
The above reasoning suggests that - when c is large - the cost of VC-Control in terms of
entrepreneurial initiative may become too high. Hence, it may be optimal to give EN the
formal control over project selection. This intuition lies behind the following result:
22Hellmann (1998) also shows that, even when they are not credit rationed, entrepreneurs may voluntarily
relinquish some control rights to venture capitalists. In his paper, the right to appoint the C.E.O. provides
the venture capitalist with ex-ante incentives to engage in an executive search. In our paper, formal control
over project selection is conferred to VC simply because she will always choose the eﬃcient project.
23Remember that EN’s lack of responsiveness to monetary incentives precludes the possibility to bribe
him when he is in control, so as to induce him to select the eﬃcient project.
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Figure 2: Plot of V V C(δvc) and V EN
Proposition 4 When the extent of VC moral hazard is large, it is optimal to grant formal
control to EN. Formally, there exists a threshold value bc ∈ (0; p∆R−B) such that the optimal
financial contract sets:
• if c ≤ bc: VC has formal control, and δ∗vc < ∆R − Bp
• if c > bc: EN has formal control and δ∗vc = ∆R− Bp
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 2 graphically shows the intuition of Proposition 4. It displays the functions
V V C(δvc) and V EN for the following values of the parameters: ∆R = 1, Bp = 0.25, τ = 0.5,
γ = 0.25, λ = 0.5, p = 0.5. Accordingly, the power of VC’s claim, δvc, varies between 0 and
0.75. The intersection of the two curves defines the threshold bδvc ≡ bcp , which takes here the
value 0.42. When δvc > 0.42, entrepreneurial control does better than VC’s control. Hence,bc = 0.21.
Remark on continuous support — In the appendix we show that similar intuitions hold
for the case where the venture capitalist can provide diﬀerent levels of support at increasing
costs, so that a riskier claim induces more support. Hence, when δvc is increased, a trade-oﬀ
between early entrepreneurial initiative and late venture capital’s support arises. One the
one hand, VC’s support is increased, which enhances the probability of success. This is
the benefit of a risky claim. One the other hand, increasing δvc destroys value by inducing
excessive real control and reduced initiative at stage 1. This is the cost of a risky claim.
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When EN has Formal Control, only the support eﬀect is present. Hence, VC is given the
riskiest claim compatible with EN’s incentives, as in Lemma 1. Conversely, under VC-Formal
Control, giving VC a risky claim has a cost as well as a benefit. Hence, the optimal level of
δvc is lower than under EN-Control.
5.1 Security design
The optimal contracts we just solved for consisted of a cash-flow splitting rule
©
δvc, RLvc
ª
and a formal control allocation. Here we illustrate how the above cash-flow rights can be
implemented through financial instruments commonly observed in venture capital deals. To
simplify matters, we restrict our analysis to the extreme cases where VC support is very
costly (c ∼= p∆R−B) and VC support has a low cost (c ≤ pδV Cvc ).
c “large”
In this case, the optimal contract allocates control to EN and gives VC a very risky claim:
δvc = ∆R− Bp and R
L
vc = I −
£
p + eENλτ
¤ ³
∆R− B
p
´
. Conversely, RLen = R
L−RLvc > 0 and
RHen = R
L
en +
B
p
. As VC gains most of ∆R, her payment in the low state is reduced so as to
ensure that EN appropriates all the surplus from the venture. These cash-flow rights can be
implemented by giving common stock to VC and preferred stock to the entrepreneur. Let r
be the minimum revenue to be paid to preferred stock-holders, and (1 − α) the fraction of
preferred stock held by EN. α is the fraction of common stock issued to VC. Preferred stock
to EN has a role in that - by promising a minimum dividend to EN - ensures that a VC
holding common stock is not paid much in the low state. Obviously, this is the case if and
only if (1− α)RL < r (e.g., RLvc = RL − r < αRL). To implement the optimal contract, it is
suﬃcient to set:
r∗ = RLen and α∗RH = RLvc + δENvc , which implies α∗ =
RLvc+∆R−Bp
RH
.24
c “small”
When c is smaller than c0 ≡ pδV Cvc , the optimal contract gives VC formal control over
the venture and a relatively safe financial claim: δvc = δV Cvc < ∆R − Bp and R
L
vc = I −£
p+ eENλτ
¤
δV Cvc . As VC captures a small part of the surplus from success ∆R, she must
receive an adequate compensation in case of failure in order that she is willing to fund the
firm. This can be done by giving preferred stock to VC and common stock to the entrepreneur.
Let r be the minimum revenue to be paid to preferred stock and α VC’s equity share. This
contract implements the optimal cash-flow rights if it satisfies:25
r∗ = RLvc and α∗RH = RLvc + δV Cvc .
24{r∗,α∗} represents indeed preferred stock provided (1− α∗)RL < r. The above is true whenever I −£
p+ eENλτ
¤ ³
∆R− Bp
´
< R
L
∆R
³
∆R− Bp
´
, that is, whenever I is suﬃciently low, or ∆R is suﬃciently large.
25This represents indeed preferred stock provided α∗RL < r∗, that is: R
L
vc+δ
VC
vc
RH
RL < RLvc.
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6 Contingent venture capital deals
Venture capital deals make an extensive use of contingencies. Gompers (1997) and Kaplan
and Strömberg (2000) report that cash-flow rights, control rights and disbursements of addi-
tional finance are made contingent upon observable measures of performance. Performance
milestones are both financial (e.g. the attainment of a minimum level of short term earnings
or net worth) and non-financial (patent approval, Federal Drug Administration approval for
new drugs). Along the life of a start-up, the parties’ rights typically evolve in the following
way. At the initial stage of financing, VCs usually enjoy control. If the company performs
poorly, VCs obtain full control; but as early performance milestones are attained, VCs lose
their superior voting, board and liquidation rights. This occurs when the VCs’ preferred
stock converts into common stock.26
According to existing theories, it is not clear why the venture capitalist should lose her
superior control rights exactly when her preferred stock can (or must) be converted into
common stock. It is puzzling that after good short-term performance VC control is reduced
and simultaneously her claim is made riskier, which in standard securities is associated
with more control. Applying our model to a multi-period setting may provide a theoretical
explanation for this contingent allocation of cash-flow and control rights.
6.1 Early profitability signals and contingent control
Assume that during the start-up’s life two non-contractible actions must be taken in sequence.
The first consists in selecting a project; the second represents all further strategic decisions
that may enhance the firm’s profitability. The timing is as follows (see also figure 3). After
the start-up’s financing, research is carried out and a project is chosen. Then, an early
signal accrues about the profitability of the project adopted. The signal is verifiable. After
signal realization, the start-up’s life proceeds exactly as in the basic model:27 information
gathering takes place over the second action; the controlling party selects the action; VC
provides a level of support c ∈ [0; 1] at private cost c2
2
. This induces a probability of success
cp. Finally, monetary profits are realized. We define the period between the initial financing
and the signal realization as the seed stage; the second round, or start-up stage,28 takes place
26In a significant number of cases, such conversion occurs automatically once the performance milestone is
attained, and thus it is not just an option oﬀered to the venture capitalist. Automatic conversion occurred
in 38% of the VC deals in Gomper’s sample. According to Kaplan and Strömberg, 73% of the financing
rounds in their sample included automatic conversion provisions.
27To simplify matters, there is no entrepreneurial moral hazard on project implementation.
28The British Venture Capital Association identifies four crucial stages in a company’s development. A the
seed stage, VC finance “allows a business idea to be developed, perhaps involving the production of a business
plan, prototypes and additional research, prior to bringing a product to market and commencing large-scale
manufacturing.” The start-up stage is “to develop the company’s products and fund their initial marketing.
Companies may be in the process of being set up or may have been trading for a short time, but not have sold
their product commercially.” In a further early stage the company may “initiate commercial manufacturing
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after the signal occurs and until the firm’s profits are realized. Usually, these early stages are
followed by an exit stage where the firm is brought to the market through an IPO. We do
not explicitly model exit as this lies beyond the scope of the paper.29 To simplify matters,
we also assume that the entrepreneur is not responsive at all to monetary incentives.30
-
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Figure 3: Time line
The initial contract must allocate control rights over both actions, as well as cash-flow
rights over the final profit. Both the cash-flow rights and formal control over the second
action can be made contingent upon the verifiable signal of project profitability. At the seed
stage, incentives for information gathering and for project selection crucially depend on how
control and cash-flow rights change upon attainment of a good (bad) signal.
The start-up stage
The events occurring after signal realization are described by our basic model with con-
tinuous VC support. As we argue in section 5 (and formally show in the appendix), the
optimal claim to be held by the venture capitalist depends on who has formal control on
the second-period action: under EN-Control, it is optimal that VC holds a risky claim so as
to induce maximal support. Under VC-Control, it is optimal to limit the riskiness of VC’s
claim so as to preserve EN’s second-round initiative. Define UENen the entrepreneur’s second-
round utility when he has formal control on the second action, and UV Cen the entrepreneur’s
second-round utility when VC has formal control.
and sales...but may not yet be generating profits.” Finally, at the expansion stage, the venture capitalist may
provide finance “to grow and expand an established company.” (A Guide to Venture Capital, page 16-17).
The final and crucial stage in the venture capital cycle is the exit stage. For a complete description of the
venture capital process, from investment to exit, see Gompers and Lerner (1999).
29See Aghion, Bolton and Tirole (2000) for an optimal contracting model analyzing exit provisions in
venture capital financing.
30We may reasonably assume that EN enjoys a fixed private benefit B from running the firm, and thus
is willing to start a firm even if he will have to bear the costs of information gathering and of project
implementation.
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The seed stage
Project selection takes place at the seed stage and is not reversible at a later stage. The
N + 1 available projects have diﬀerent probabilities of success (p + τ k) and private costs
(γk) for the entrepreneur. Let us slightly generalize the basic model by assuming that one
project (N − 2) has disastrous consequences for the firm (τN−2 = −p) but gives a private
benefit b to the entrepreneur (γN−2 = −b). When project (N − 2) is available, EN’s and
VC’s preferences over projects are never congruent, as EN invariably prefers project (N − 2)
to any other project. Hence, VC should have formal control at the seed stage, as she always
chooses the profit-enhancing project while EN never does.
There is a problem, though. Suppose VC has formal control at the seed stage. Should
she ever rubber-stamp the entrepreneur’s proposal when uninformed? Obviously not: if EN
proposes a project, this must be his favorite one, namely, the value-destroying project (N−2).
As his proposal will never be accepted, EN has no incentive to gather information ex ante.
This lack of initiative impounds on the firm’s value, in that it will always stick to the status
quo project. To put it in other words, “the key to entrepreneurial real control (and initiative!)
is congruence”:31 if EN’s preferences are never congruent with the investor’s objectives, his
proposals are never rubber-stamped, which completely kills initiative as a result. To partially
realign EN’s preferences over projects with the objective of profit maximization, a contingent
control allocation in the second round may be called for.
Assume that early performance variables realized at the end of the seed stage signal
whether a value-destroying project was chosen: if (N − 2) is selected, a bad signal (L)
accrues. If any other project is selected, signal L only accrues with probability (1− ξ), while
with probability ξ > 0 a good signal (H) accrues. A contract allocating second-round control
to the entrepreneur if the early signal is good and to the venture capitalist if the signal is bad
can ensure that EN - when informed - never proposes project (N − 2) at the seed stage.32
This is the case if:
ξUENen + (1− ξ)UV Cen ≥ b
which holds whenever entrepreneurial benefits of control in the second round are large
enough. By realigning EN’s preferences with VC’s, contingent second-round control allows
to grant seed-stage control to the venture capitalist (as is eﬃcient), and yet preserve en-
trepreneurial initiative at that stage. As showed in our basic model, it is optimal to tie to
31A discussion of these issues can be found in Tirole (2000).
32We are not the first to propose this “carrot-and-stick” view of contingent control. Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994) argue for instance that shifting control to tough investors after bad performance is a way to
discipline managers when monetary incentives are costly to provide. Note that monetary incentives need not
be completely ruled out in order to derive the optimality of contingent control. It can be argued that late
moral hazard may significantly reduce the eﬀectiveness of monetary incentives. For instance, in our setting,
if EN must hold an incompressible stake Bp in the firm’s upside (as it is the case in the basic model), he
cannot be severely punished in monetary terms after a bad signal accrues.
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each control allocation an appropriate design of cash-flow rights, so as to give a relatively
safe claim to the party in control. Hence, cash-flow rights should as well be contingent upon
the early signal. This suggests that the following contract may deal appropriately with the
multiple incentive problems aﬀecting the firm: the venture capitalist holds superior voting
and board rights at the close of the financing and takes convertible preferred equity in the
firm. When an early performance milestone is attained, control is shifted back to the founder,
and VC’s preferred stock is converted into common. The particular terms of this contract
are similar to those observed in the venture capital world.
7 Evidence from the corporate world
We argued that there exists a trade-oﬀ between giving a venture capitalist the incentive to
support a start-up with professional advice and business connections, and limiting her taste
for excess interference (real control). Hence, when the firm requires a large support from its
venture capital investor, it is optimal to reduce the latter’s control rights. A recent paper by
Hellmann and Puri (2000) provides indirect evidence that this is indeed the case. Using data
on Silicon Valley start-up companies, Hellmann and Puri construct a measure for venture
capital support, what they call the “soft side of venture capital”. They find that the latter
is negatively correlated with VC’s control rights (the “hard side of venture capital”).33 They
also show that “the role of venture capital is state contingent, focussing more on control
in the bad state and more on support in the good state”. This second piece of evidence is
in line with the results in section 6, whereby after a good short-term signal the investor’s
incentives are tightened and her control rights reduced.
We proved that holders of risky claims should be assigned less control rights than holders
of safe claims. However, we do not claim that common equity and control should always be
negatively correlated. As the analysis focuses on those firms where entrepreneurial initiative
is an essential input for success, our predictions are likely to hold in the case of high-tech,
early start-ups. The way cash-flow and control rights evolve along the life of a start-up (doc-
umented by both Gompers, 1997 and Kaplan and Strömberg, 2000) confirms our predictions.
Cross-sectional results also seem to support our theory: Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) find
that in first-round investments the degree of VC control is positively correlated with the
performance sensitivity of the founder ’s claim.34 This suggests that the degree of VC con-
trol is negatively correlated with the performance sensitivity of the venture capitalist ’s claim
(unfortunately, this correlation is not directly measured in their paper).
33More specifically, the paper focuses on VC support to “team building” (recruitment process, design of
human resource policies and of stock option plans for key employees), while VC control is measured by the
right to replace the founders with outside CEOs.
34In their sample, when the VC has (voting) control, about thirty percent of the founder’s equity stake is
contingent on performance versus a three percent when the founder has control.
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According to Proposition 4, investors who can substantially contribute to success of a
portfolio company, but have a high opportunity cost of doing so (e.g. have a high c), should
hold high-powered monetary incentives and weak control rights. A widespread perception
in the business community is that corporate venture funds display these characteristics to
a larger extent than independent venture capital houses. Corporate investors are playing
an increasing role in the venture capital arena: leading firms like Intel Corporation, Lucent
Technologies, NBC, Oracle have all created their own corporate venturing programs in the
past few years. On the one hand, both entrepreneurs and independent VCs recognize the
added value of having a corporate investor as a partner in a deal. According to David Barry
of Asset Alternatives Inc., “an investment from a corporate powerhouse like Intel Corp.,
Lucent Technologies, NBC, or even Amazon.com Inc. may determine whether a technology,
telecom or internet start-up succeeds or fails.”35 On the other hand, corporate investors are
not as trusted as independent venture capitalists are when it comes to confidentiality over
new ideas: once the internal plans and developments of an emerging company have been
learned by the corporate venture capitalist, the latter may have very poor incentives to favor
the start-up’s success, and rather let the technological information be exploited by her parent
house. This explains why many entrepreneurs express concerns about confidentiality when
leading with corporate VCs and why they fear corporate control. In line with our theory,
the most successful corporate venturing programs have adopted clear-cut policies to protect
entrepreneurs. The most eﬀective is probably to keep an hands-oﬀ approach: Gene Franz,
senior director of the venture arm of Oracle Corporation, declares for instance that “Oracle
Venture Partners generally doesn’t seek a board seat, or attempt to dictate the running of
portfolio companies.” Gompers and Lerner (1999) also document that corporate VCs do not
take board seats in portfolio firms; moreover, compared to independent VCs, they are much
more likely to invest in late financing rounds, e.g. when research eﬀort and entrepreneurial
initiative have already been exerted.
Other casual evidence in the corporate world supports our view that risky claims (for
instance, large equity stakes) need not necessarily be associated with control. Indeed, the
same phenomena that determine the terms of corporate venture capital deals lie behind the
sophisticated partnership deals between biotech start-ups and big drug companies. Biotech
entrepreneurs often finance their research by raising funds from leading drug firms. These
may be helpful financiers when it comes to advising biotech research, or even performing the
costly stages of testing and manufacturing a newly discovered drug. However, as we already
argued, a controlling corporate partner willing to keep an eye on new discoveries may be
tempted to appropriate the good ones (or destroy the ones that compete with its leading
drugs). Apparently, scared by excess interference and the risk of cannibalization, biotech
35Except where indicated otherwise, all quotations in this section are drawn from The Corporate Venturing
Directory & Yearbook (2000).
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start-ups are becoming more and more cautious when writing such “window-on-technology”
deals. As reported in The Economist (August 29th, 1992), “...when a big drug firm buys a
controlling stake in a biotech firm, it is usually careful to let the firm’s founders continue to
run it”. One striking example: when Hoﬀmann-La Roche bought a 60% stake in Genentech
- an American biotech lab - in 1990, “it demanded only two of Genentech’s 13 board sits”.
As is the case for many moral hazard models, the existence of reputational mechanisms
would obviously temper the results in our paper. If a venture capitalist is concerned about
being known to treat entrepreneurs fairly, he will be reluctant to expropriate entrepreneurial
ideas or over-interfere in the firm’s management at the expense of entrepreneurial private
benefits of control. Our prediction is then that contractual terms like the ones described
here should be more common when there are doubts about whether the (corporate) investor
is a long-term player in the venture capital market.
8 Concluding remarks
Although cash-flows and control rights are strongly interrelated in venture capital deals,
financial contracting models focus on one mechanism in isolation. This paper develops an
optimal contracting model where cash-flow rights and control rights are allocated indepen-
dently, and yet are shown to follow a joint pattern. Our theory challenges the common idea
that risky claims (e.g. common stock) should always be associated to more control rights,
as it used to be the case in standard securities. In line with our results, venture capital
contracts, corporate venturing deals, and sophisticated partnership deals between biotech
start-ups and big drug companies often display a negative correlation between control rights
and riskiness of claims. Our theory also explains the use - documented in Gompers (1997)
and Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) - of contingent contracts where the investor’s superior
control rights are reduced and her claim is converted into a riskier one upon attainment of
early performance milestones. These features of innovative financial deals have never been
rationalized in earlier theoretical work.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The optimal cash-flow splitting rule solves:
MaxRLvc,δvc
h
(RL −RLvc) + (p+ eENλτ)Bp − (1− eEN)γ −
(eEN )2
2
i
s.t.:
(ICen) (R
H
en −RLen) ≥ Bp
(IRvc) R
L
vc +
£
p+ eENλτ
¤
δvc ≥ I
RLen = R
L −RLvc and (RHen −RLen) = ∆R − δvc
eEN = λτ B
p
+ γ
Note first that, as EN is risk-averse, it is optimal to set (ICen) binding. Secondly, as under
EN-Control information gathering eﬀorts are independent of δvc, δvc can be set arbitrarily
large without inducing “excess interference” of VC. Hence, it is optimal to increase the risky
payment δvc up to ∆R − Bp and reduce R
L
vc so as to keep for EN most of the “safe” return.
Obviously, RLvc is set so as to keep (IRvc) binding:
RLvc = I −
£
p+ eENλτ
¤ ³
∆R− B
p
´
< RL
by (A4)
Proof of Proposition 2
To simplify calculations, let us define the following variables:
X = τ∆R− γ
F = γ − τ B
p
G = λτ∆R+ γ
We can then re-write the value of the venture under VC-Control as:
V V C(e, E) = [RL + p∆R− γ − I] + eG+ eE(1− λ)X − e
2
2
− E
2
2
The net marginal benefit of EN’s initiative is:
∂V V C
∂e = G+ (1− λ)EX − e
while the net marginal benefit of VC’s monitoring is:
∂V V C
∂E = e(1− λ)X −E
• Let us first prove a preliminary result:
Lemma 5 The value of the venture V V C(δvc) under VC-Formal Control is concave in δvc.
Proof. As E(δvc) is monotonically increasing in δvc, we can as well study V V C(E), where
e has been replaced with the best reply e(E). Diﬀerentiating w.r.t. E :
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dV V C
dE
= ∂V
V C
∂E +
∂V V C
∂e
de
dE
=
= [e(E)(1− λ)X − E] + [G+ (1− λ)EX − e(E)] [−F (1− λ)]
And as e(E) = eEN − F (1− λ)E, we obtain:
(1) dV
V C
dE
= eEN(1− λ)X − F (1− λ)2XE − E − F (1− λ)G
−F (1− λ)2XE + eENF (1− λ)− F 2(1− λ)2E
The second derivative is then:
(2) d
2V V C
dE2
= −2F (1− λ)2X − F 2(1− λ)2 − 1 < 0
• We now study the optimal level of E
As V (E) is concave, the optimal level of E is determined by the first order condition:
dV V C
dE
=
∂V V C
∂E +
∂V V C
∂e
de
dE
= 0
The first term represents the control eﬀect. Under VC-Control, increasing E (e.g. real
control) benefits the venture in that VC imposes the value-enhancing project more of-
ten. However, monitoring has a cost. Therefore, the control eﬀect is positive provided
e(1 − λ)X − E > 0. The second term represents the initiative eﬀect. This eﬀect is always
negative: increased monitoring and interference discourage EN’s information-gathering eﬀort
(initiative), which is the engine for discovering value-enhancing projects.
• We are left to prove that δV Cvc < ∆R− Bp
Suppose not. Then δV Cvc = ∆R − Bp and from VC’s F.O.C. for eﬀort E we have: E =
E = e(1 − λ)τ
³
∆R− B
p
´
. But then, as e(1 − λ)X − E < 0, the control eﬀect is negative
and so is dV
V C
dE
. Hence, δV Cvc should optimally be reduced below ∆R− Bp . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Setting δvc = 0 one obtains EV C = 0, eV C = eEN and:
V V C(0) = [RL + p∆R − γ − I] + eENG− (e
EN )2
2
= V EN .
Whatever is achieved with EN-Control can always be achieved by granting formal control
to VC and giving her a safe claim (δvc = 0) so that VC never has any real control. Hence, VC-
Control does weakly better than EN-Control. Indeed, under some mild condition, VC-Control
is strictly preferred to EN-Control. This is the case whenever:
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dV V C
dE
(E = 0) > 0
that is, it is optimal to have VC exercise “some” real control. Substituting E = 0 in (1),
we obtain:
dV V C
dE
(0) = eEN(1− λ)X − F (1− λ)G+ eENF (1− λ) =
λτ 2∆RB
p
+ λτ 2B
p
(∆R− B
p
) + γ [(1− λ)τ∆R− γ]
Note that λ < 1− γτ∆R is a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for the above expression
to be positive: when the congruence of interests between the parties is low and initiative is
maximal (e = eEN), it is optimal to give control to the investor, as her objectives are more
in line with those of the venture.
For completeness we show below that VC’s participation constraint never binds.
Therefore, value-maximization is the only criterion determining the allocation of control.
Lemma 6 Whenever the value of the venture is larger under VC-Control (e.g., V V C >
V EN), the investor’s pledgeable income also is. This, and assumption (A4), imply that VC-
Control is feasible.
Proof. After tedious calculations, we obtain:
(V V C − V EN )− (P l.IncV C − Pl.IncEN) =
= −(1− λ)
³
γ − B
p
´
EV C(eV C + eEN) < 0
Thus, V V C > V EN =⇒ P l.IncV C > Pl.IncEN > I
by (A4)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
First, let us define c0 ≡ pδV Cvc (where δV Cvc is the optimal riskiness of VC claim when VC
support is contractible). Clearly, when VC has formal control and c ≤ c0, the constraint
δvc ≥ cp does not bind. Thus, the shape of the investor’s claim does not depend on the extent
of VC’s moral hazard c, and is determined as in section 4.2. The value of the venture is
then: Maxδvc V
V C(δvc), which we know is larger than V EN .
When c > c0, (ICvc) binds and VC’s claim can no longer be shaped so as to induce the
optimal amount of real control. Then, δvc = cp and the value of the venture, V V C(
c
p
), is
monotonically decreasing in c. Define as bδvc the value of δvc such that: V V C(bδvc) = V EN .
This value satisfies bδvc < ∆R − Bp . Then, V V C(δvc) < V EN for δvc > bδvc. Therefore, for any
c > bc ≡ bδvcp, EN-Control is to be preferred to VC-Control.
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Continuous VC support
We analyze here the case where the venture capitalist can provide diﬀerent levels of
support. At stage 2, she exerts a nonverifiable eﬀort c ∈ [0; 1] at a private cost c2
2
. Provided
the entrepreneur works at this stage, this induces a probability of success cp. The first best
level of support is then equal to p∆R. The venture capitalist’s first order condition for c is:
pδvc = c (ICvc)
As expected, VC’s support is increasing in the riskiness of her claim. We can now study the
optimal design of the claim under EN-Control and VC-Control.
Under EN-Control, the value of the venture is:
V EN =
©
RL − γ − I
ª
+ eEN [λτ∆R+ γ]− (eEN )2
2
+ pc∆R− c2
2
where c is given by (ICvc). Taking the derivative with respect to δvc yields:
dV EN
dδvc
=
∂V EN
∂c
dc
dδvc
= p2 [∆R− δvc] > 0
∂V EN
∂c
dc
dδvc is the support eﬀect : a riskier claim benefits a start-up by increasing VC’s incentives
to provide support at stage 2. As this eﬀect is always positive, Lemma 1’s result carries
through: under EN-Control it is optimal to give VC the riskiest possible claim: δENvc =
∆R − B
p
. Under VC-Control, the value of the venture is:
V V C =
©
RL − γ − I
ª
+ eV C [λτ∆R+ γ] + eV CEV C(1− λ) [τ∆R− γ]
− (e
V C)2
2
− (E
V C)2
2
+ pc∆R− c2
2
where c = pδvc, e = eV C(δvc) and E = EV C(δvc).
Diﬀerentiating with respect to δvc:
dV V C
dδvc
=
∂V V C
∂c
dc
dδvc
+
∂V V C
∂e
de
dδvc
+
∂V V C
∂E
dE
dδvc
(+) (−) (?)
where the support eﬀect (the first term) is to be balanced with the initiative eﬀect (the
second term) and the control eﬀect (the third term). If we set δvc = ∆R − Bp , the control
eﬀect is negative. It follows that VC’s optimal claim must be safer than under EN-Control.
Proposition 2 then extends to the case of continuous support.
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